By N. C. Bipindra

Geopolitical tensions are at an all-time high amid turmoil in West Asia, with its implications now felt globally. As for South Asia, Pakistan takes the spotlight once again for being a rogue nation for launching airstrikes in Afghanistan and declaring an “open war” when Kabul retaliates.

With about 42 Afghan civilians killed by Pakistan’s military strikes at the border and the displacement of an estimated 16,400 households in Afghanistan, a humanitarian crisis is looming at the hands of Islamabad.

Pakistan’s aggression in Afghanistan is likely to extend to the larger South Asian neighbourhood, if not checked. Bangladesh’s cosying up to Pakistan under the former interim government, therefore, raises new security concerns for the now elected government in Dhaka, headed by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

Bangladesh’s foreign policy now rests on ‘Bangladesh First’, meaning securing its national interest over those of others. A commendable aspect of BNP’s manifesto is the party’s policy of ‘zero tolerance towards terrorism,’ including not allowing Bangladesh’s soil to be used for militancy and extremism.

While it is too early to judge if the new government can live up to its commitment on the same, Bangladesh’s recent past gave a few red signals. Mainly, Dhaka’s excessive Islamabad tilt under Muhammad Yunus-led interim government, by completely sidelining Bangladesh’s long demand for Pakistan’s apology for 1971, a historical grievance that is not yet addressed.

Since Hasina’s ouster, Bangladesh and Pakistan not only resumed direct trade links but also accelerated their defence cooperation via high-level exchanges, talks of joint military training and cooperation, naval exercises, and interest in defence procurement, including Bangladesh’s interest in the potential sale of JF-17 jets by Islamabad during the Bangladesh Air Force chief’s Pakistan visit.

The resumption of Karachi-Dhaka direct flights after a 14-year suspension following this visit also hints at its link to broader defence ties. Although no formal defence pact had been reached under the interim government, expansion of defence cooperation also included exchanges on intelligence sharing, which, before 2024, was very restricted.

A joint intelligence sharing mechanism has been established that aims to monitor not just maritime security, but airspace, especially along the India-Bangladesh bordering region. This has raised concerns about Pakistan’s intention, given the history of Pakistan’s ISI’s involvement in training and arming separatist militant groups in India’s northeast, such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).

Sheikh Hasina’s tenure witnessed intensive curbing of cross-border terrorism. While India and Bangladesh have their own shared border issues, border security, especially a resurgence of insurgent camps on Bangladeshi soil, should be avoided at all costs. Pakistan’s repeated attempts to instigate border tensions along its shared border with India to destabilise the latter should be warning signs for Bangladesh to trade its cards right.

The resurgence of Islamists in post-Hasina Bangladesh also witnessed groups deemed terrorist organisations, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, taking up public space to demand the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Bangladesh.

Moreover, last year, many reports of Bangladeshi nationals joining Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged. TTP is a jihadist militant organisation that is now fighting against the Pakistan army. Pakistan blames Afghanistan Taliban for aiding the TTP, justifying its now military aggressions in Afghanistan, a claim Kabul denies.

While Bangladesh needs to address its own problems of religious radicalism, the reports of its nationals joining TTP add a new concern for Dhaka: Islamabad extending its ‘open war’ to Bangladesh under the same accusation of ‘aiding TTP’, like it is now doing against Afghanistan.

The potential for increasing extremism within Bangladesh due to Pakistan-Afghanistan tension cannot be ruled out either. Historically, Bangladesh militant groups are all ideologically inspired by the Taliban, while the most prominent groups like Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) have even received training and logistic support from both al-Qaeda and Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

Since Pakistan and Afghanistan are no longer allies (rather, enemies), Bangladesh, which has been witnessing a resurgence of Islamists, is likely to see radicalism not only expanded but also fragmented, aggravating Bangladesh’s internal security.

In January, Afghanistan expressed interest in expanding economic ties with Bangladesh, reciprocated by Dhaka. Bangladesh, on the other hand, seeks to revive SAARC by talking to all friendly partners.

While Pakistan has shown keen interest in reviving SAARC, Islamabad’s repeated engagement in tensions along its borders makes it a rotten apple in the South Asian neighbourhood, and in effect, of SAARC. ‘Bangladesh First’ foreign policy, therefore, is to face a crucial test under the new government, especially its policy on zero terrorism and extremism.

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