By Brig Devasheesh Chowdhury (Retired)

On the eve of the first anniversary of Operation Sindoor, India unveiled its first 12 GHz Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) capability. The timing felt symbolic. Operation Sindoor brought drones into Indian living rooms and public conversations in a way few events had before. What many people saw earlier as a distant technological duel playing out in Ukraine suddenly became real and immediate. Drone warfare was no longer someone else’s problem. Spy versus Spy was no longer restricted to MAD comics.

India’s domestic anti-drone industry has already built a strong base over the last few years. Several indigenous companies working largely in the 400 MHz to 6 GHz spectrum helped develop systems capable of neutralising commercial drones dependent on ISM frequencies and GNSS signals. These systems formed an important first layer of defence and demonstrated that Indian industry could respond quickly to emerging security requirements.

But as recent conflicts have shown, the threat is evolving very quickly. The next challenge lies beyond 6 GHz. Modern loitering munitions, relay-enabled FPV swarms, SATCOM-linked UAVs, and battlefield drones increasingly rely on higher-frequency communication links designed to survive conventional jamming. This is where the conversation around X-band and Ku-band capability becomes important.

Among Indian firms, Zen Technologies had already moved beyond conventional frequency ranges with systems extending up to 8 GHz as early as 2023, making it the only Indian company to integrate ISSM and wideband. At the North Tech Symposium 2026 in Prayagraj, the company unveiled a fully integrated AI-powered modular C-UAS platform offering wideband coverage from 70 MHz to 12 GHz X-band, with future-ready Ku-band extensions.

That is a significant development for India’s defence ecosystem because it signals a move from systems designed mainly against commercial drone threats toward electronic warfare-grade counter-drone capability. The distinction matters.

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia have shown that adversaries are increasingly shifting toward higher-frequency communication links because they are harder to disrupt using traditional methods. Systems operating only in lower bands may still be effective against commercial platforms, but military-grade threats are steadily moving into more resilient architectures.

At the same time, it is important not to oversimplify the problem. Even a 12 GHz capability is not a complete answer by itself. Drone warfare is changing faster than procurement cycles can keep up with. Modern systems now use frequency hopping, autonomous navigation, mesh networking, AI-assisted targeting, and low-probability-of-intercept communication methods.

Then there is the growing use of fibre-optic-controlled FPV drones. These systems bypass RF jamming altogether because the control signals move through physical fibre-optic cables instead of wireless links. That changes the equation significantly and highlights the limitations of relying purely on jamming.

The future of counter-drone warfare will therefore depend on layered electronic warfare ecosystems rather than standalone jammers.

That means combining:
• Broad-spectrum RF detection
• Electro-optical, thermal, and acoustic sensing
• AI-assisted sensor fusion
• Multi-band jamming across X- and Ku-bands
• GNSS denial and spoofing
• Directed-energy systems
• Hard-kill and kinetic neutralisation options

This is also where future GSQRs (General Staff Qualitative Requirements) will likely undergo major change. For years, many procurement requirements were framed around defeating commercial drones or isolated low-end threats. That approach will no longer be enough. Future GSQRs will increasingly need to mandate wideband coverage, integrated sensor fusion, swarm-handling capability, counter-SATCOM functionality, and resilience against mesh networking and autonomous drone behaviour.

Testing standards will also need to evolve. Single-drone demonstrations in controlled conditions cannot realistically represent modern battlefield environments. Future evaluations will likely require live swarm trials and testing under contested electromagnetic conditions.

Globally, only a handful of countries currently dominate this space. RTX, Anduril Industries, DZYNE Technologies, and Israeli firms such as Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, and Elbit Systems have spent years building integrated higher-spectrum EW capability.

For India, indigenous progress in this domain has significance beyond technology alone. It strengthens the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) and IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed, and Manufactured) vision by reducing long-term import dependence and building domestic competence in advanced electronic warfare systems. In the rapidly evolving drone battlespace, long-term effectiveness will belong to nations with strong IDDM ecosystems capable of continuously adapting counter-technologies faster than emerging threats evolve.

There are still challenges ahead — spectrum allocation, thermal management, integration into layered air defence networks, and export readiness among them. But these are natural challenges for any country trying to move into the next generation of warfare capability.

The broader reality is becoming clear across the world: future wars will not be decided only by who has more drones. They will increasingly be shaped by who can better detect, disrupt, deceive, survive, and adapt across the electromagnetic battlespace.

India has now entered that phase seriously. And perhaps the sky is no longer the limit. It is simply the next frequency band waiting to be understood and mastered.

(The author is a fourth-generation army officer. An alumnus of NDA, DSSC, and CDM, he raised the first Pinaka Regiment in the Indian Army. He superannuated in September 2024 and has been with Zen Technologies Limited since November 2025)

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