By N. C. Bipindra

New Delhi: During Operation Rising Lion, launched by Israel on June 13, 2025, Iran‘s air defence systems exhibited a mix of limited success and notable vulnerabilities. In this episode of Defence Capital Conversations, Lt. Gen. V.K. Saxena, former Director General of Army Air Defence, Indian Army, provides a detailed breakdown of the Iranian Air Defence systems’ performance during the Israeli aerial strikes.

Initial Detection and Response

Iranian early-warning systems, particularly radar installations near Natanz, Isfahan, and Bandar Abbas, detected incoming projectiles and UAVs shortly after midnight.

Despite early alerts, there was a delay in coordinated response, attributed to Israel’s use of low-observable (stealth) munitions and electronic warfare techniques that disrupted Iran’s command and control networks.

Performance of Key Air Defence Systems

Bavar-373 (Iran’s S-300 equivalent): Deployed around high-value targets like Fordow and Natanz, it managed to intercept a limited number of incoming drones and cruise missiles. However, it struggled against Israeli standoff munitions (such as the Rampage and Delilah missiles) and swarm drone tactics that saturated its radar tracking capability.

Russian-supplied S-300PMU-2: Positioned primarily near Tehran and western Iran, the S-300s had better success rates, particularly against high-altitude Israeli UAVs. But the Israeli use of decoys and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) likely overwhelmed some batteries.

Short and Medium-Range Systems (Khordad-3, Sayyad-2, and Tor-M1): These systems were active around military airports and missile bases. They were effective against smaller drones, but failed to intercept high-speed, precision-guided munitions that struck command posts and radar facilities.

Outcome of the Israeli Strikes

Significant damage was reported at:

• Natanz enrichment facility (deep-underground sections likely damaged by bunker-busting munitions).
• IRGC air bases, with fuel depots and missile launchers, were hit.

Israel also targeted radar and SAM command nodes, rendering multiple batteries temporarily blind and uncoordinated.

Gaps and Exposed Weaknesses

Lack of integrated air defence: Iranian systems were not effectively networked, leading to overlapping zones with poor coordination.

Inadequate reaction to ECM: Israeli aircraft and drones used electronic countermeasures that confused Iranian radar tracking and missile locks. Over-reliance on older Soviet-era systems like the Tor-M1, which are less effective against modern low-RCS (radar cross-section) threats.

Iranian Narrative and Recovery Efforts

Iranian state media claimed “most drones and missiles were intercepted,” but satellite imagery and open-source intelligence contradicted those assertions, showing multiple high-impact hits.

Iran has since moved to:

• Reposition air defence assets.
• Request emergency technical support from Russia and China.
• Accelerate deployment of newer Bavar variants with upgraded AESA radars and anti-stealth capability.

Summary Assessment

Israel’s multi-domain strike package — combining stealth drones, precision-guided missiles, and cyber-electronic warfare — outmatched Iran’s current air defence network.

Iran’s defenses were partially effective, especially in lower-tier zones, but inadequate in protecting strategic nuclear and IRGC infrastructure.

The operation exposed systemic flaws in Iran’s air defence doctrine and its inability to defend against a coordinated, technologically superior adversary.

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